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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
DEATH-PENALTY APPEALS AND POST-CONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS
PREFACE
Representing a death-row inmate-either on the direct
appeal to a state's highest appellate court or on habeas corpus or
"collateral" review in the state or federal courts-is the most
daunting task a lawyer will undertake. In many respects, it is
more daunting than representing a capital defendant at trial.
At the trial stage, a defense lawyer usually has significant
control over the case-in terms of what facts to develop and
what legal issues to preserve for appeal. Conversely, a lawyer
representing a death-row inmate on direct or collateral appeal
often lacks control over both the facts and the legal claims in the
case, which more often than not were set in stone by another
lawyer representing the inmate during a prior stage of the
proceedings.' If factual or legal issues were not properly raised
I. During the past three decades, the Supreme Court, Congress, and state legislatures
have erected myriad procedural barriers to raising factual and legal matters on direct and
collateral appeals in capital cases. See e.g. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)
(applying procedural default doctrine to foreclose review of a state death-row inmate's
constitutional claim in federal habeas corpus proceeding based on his state counsel's
deficient performance in failing to file a timely appeal in the state habeas corpus
proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2002) (codification of amendments to federal habeas
corpus statutory scheme in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
(available at http://uscode.house.gov); Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 11.071 (West 2003)
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at the first available opportunity, such issues usually cannot be
raised later in the case, absent a compelling (and usually
impossible) showing of the death-row inmate's "actual
innocence" or legal ineligibility for the death penalty.2 As a
result of these procedural barriers, the "Great Writ" of federal
habeas corpus-once the ultimate safety net for capital
defendants convicted or sentenced to death in an
unconstitutional manner-increasingly has lost its teeth. Thus,
as Justice Blackmun wrote in his dissent from the denial of
certiorari in McFarlandv. Scott,3 "[m]ore often than not.., it is
in the proceedings antecedent to federal habeas corpus ... that a

capital defendant's case is won or lost" by his counsel in those
prior proceedings.4
The procedural straitjacket in which countless appellate and
habeas lawyers-particularly those on federal habeas corpus
review-find themselves in capital cases raises two questions
addressed by the articles in this special section. First, what can a
lawyer representing a death-row inmate do in the initial stages of
capital appellate and collateral proceedings to avoid procedural
hurdles from foreclosing relief at some subsequent stage of the
case? And, second, what type of systemic reforms should occur
to prevent the injustices that befall the many death-row inmates
whose attorneys failed to preserve legal and factual issues in
prior proceedings in their cases?
Charles Blackmar offers the unusual perspective of a
widely respected legal scholar and jurist who at different times
in his career has represented capital defendants on appeal;
represented the prosecution in direct and collateral appeals in
capital cases; and sat as an appellate judge in dozens of direct
and collateral appeals in capital cases. His article offers helpful
advice to lawyers, particularly uninitiated ones, who represent
death-row inmates seeking to reverse their convictions or
sentences.
(codification of 1995 amendments to Texas's habeas corpus statutory scheme, which
limited the availability of post-conviction relief in Texas capital cases).
2. See e.g. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2254(e)(2) (2002) (available at http://uscode.
house.gov).
3. 512 U.S. 1256 (1994).
4. Id. at 1256.
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Two academics with substantial experience actually
representing death-row inmates-legal scholars Eric Freedman
and Andrew Hammel-propose reforms in the current system
while providing helpful advice to the practitioner. Eric
Freedman, who served as Reporter for the ABA's 2003
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,5 discusses the ABA's
proposals, most notably the position that the Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel should extend beyond
a death-row inmate's direct appeal and apply to state and federal
habeas corpus proceedings. He also discusses the need to
provide post-conviction counsel with the same "tools for the
defense" traditionally made available to trial counsel 6 -tools
like investigators, experts in mental health, and mitigation
specialists.
Andrew Hammel takes a somewhat different approach, and
eschews the broader argument that the Supreme Court should
overrule existing precedent7 and hold that the Constitution
guarantees death-row inmates the right to effective
representation on collateral review. His proposed reform is
narrower, although it appears to achieve the same end. He first
surveys the current legal landscape in the states that actively
employ capital punishment, noting the various approaches states
have taken in seeking to promote effective representation on
state collateral review. He concludes that, at least for the time
being, the best approach is to provide a "unitary" system,
whereby a death row inmate's direct and collateral appeals in the
state court system occur simultaneously-prior to the inmate's
conviction becoming final-and extend the right of effective
assistance of counsel to both tracks of such a unitary system.
LaJuana Davis, an Alabama lawyer who represents deathrow defendants, addresses the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Atkins v. Virginia,' in which it overruled prior
precedent and held that the execution of mentally retarded
5. See 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913 (2003) (reprinting Guidelines and Commentary).
6. See Ake v. Okla., 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
7. Murray v. Giarratano,492 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that there is no constitutional

right to counsel on collateral review in capital cases).
8. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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defendants is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. She
underscores the need for capital-defense counsel, including
counsel representing a death-row inmate for the first time on
collateral review, to engage in an exhaustive investigation to
determine whether their clients are mentally retarded. She also
discusses the mental-health profession's various standards and
tests addressing mental retardation, and urges lawyers and
judges to master that science instead of relying solely on the
results of I.Q. tests when assessing whether a client is mentally
retarded.
All of these articles highlight the extremely important,
difficult, and sadly, too often thankless, job that capital-defense
counsel perform at all stages of appellate and post-conviction
proceedings. We hope that those who currently represent deathrow inmates will gather helpful information or insights from the
articles included here. And we hope too that other lawyers may
be inspired by what they read to accept the representation of
death-row inmates on direct or collateral appeal.
BEN
Houston, Texas
December 15, 2003

